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Abstract
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately
informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at
most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Exclusive competition is at
the centre stage of recent analyses of markets with private information. Economic models of
exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truth-
ful revelation of agents’ exogenous private information. This paper investigates the rationale
for this restriction. We provide two results. First, we construct an economic example showing
that direct mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict
to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium
outcomes survive against principals’ unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
We study competing-mechanism games of incomplete information in which competition is exclu-
sive: contracts incorporate exclusivity clauses and they are fully enforced. Thus, upon observing
her private information and the publicly observable mechanisms, each agent can participate and
communicate with at most one principal. Each principal fully observes the set of agents who par-
ticipate with him, and agents take no hidden actions. Final allocations are determined by the
contracts that principals independently sign with agents.
Exclusive competition is at the hearth of most theoretical analyses of markets with privately
informed agents. This assumption plays a fundamental role in competing auctions (McAfee, 1993),
competitive screening (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976), competitive search (Guerrieri et al., 2010),
and competing hierarchies (Martimort, 1996) models, among many others. At the same time,
letting firms compete over exclusive contracts is regarded as a convenient way to represent full
observability of agents’ trades in the extension of general equilibrium theory to private information
economies (Prescott and Townsend, 1984; Bisin and Gottardi, 2006).
Despite the prominent role of these economic settings, we still lack a general characterization
of equilibrium mechanisms under exclusive competition. Indeed, the approaches above share the
restriction to standard direct mechanisms: each principal commits to incentive schemes that as-
sociate his decisions to the array of exogenous types reported by agents.1 In addition, they focus
on incentive compatible mechanisms which induce agents to truthfully reveal their types to the
principal they participate with. Yet, few, if any, theoretical arguments have been developed to
support these choices. If competition is exclusive, to what extent can one safely restrict attention
to direct mechanisms and to agents’ truthful behaviors? The present paper contributes to answer
this question by setting up a general competing-mechanism setting of exclusive competition, and
introducing a solution concept that formalizes the above restrictions. We provide two main results.
First, we show that the restriction to direct mechanisms involves a loss of generality. We exhibit
a pure strategy equilibrium outcome of an incomplete information game, in which principals post
indirect mechanisms that cannot be reproduced in the game in which they post direct ones. The
example is casted in a stylized competitive insurance setting in which two insurance companies
compete to serve two privately informed consumers. We show that the communication made
available by indirect mechanisms allows to support a monopolistic allocation at equilibrium. Indeed,
indirect mechanisms generate threats that the monopolistic principal cannot reproduce by relying
on simple direct mechanisms.
Second, we formalize the restrictions made in economic applications by introducing the notion
1In such direct mechanisms, agents only communicate to principals their exogenous private information (type),
but not the market information generated by the presence of several competing mechanisms. Modeling this additional
communication may require very complex message spaces. Epstein and Peters (1999) are the first to characterize
the universal mechanisms which allow to report all relevant information, therefore formalizing an extended notion of
type for the agents. This abstract construction, however, has little bite in applications, as extensively discussed by
Peters (2014).
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of truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium. In a competing-mechanism game in which principals
post direct mechanisms, a truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium is a (subgame perfect) equi-
librium in which agents are truthful on the equilibrium path, and no principal has a profitable
deviation regardless of the continuation equilibrium that agents may play. We investigate whether
the corresponding outcomes survive if a principal deviates to general mechanisms. This amounts
to analyzing the implications of enlarging the strategy space of a single principal, holding fixed
the behavior of his rivals. We prove that any truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium in which
principals play pure strategies survives if a principal deviates to any indirect mechanism. As will be
discussed in Section 2, this provides a rationale for the restrictions postulated in applications. The
result crucially relies on the assumption of exclusive competition, which ties an agent’s communi-
cation to her participation choice. This is shown by means of a two-principals two-agents example,
in which agents’ communication is unrestricted: each type of each agent can participate with at
most one principal, and can send non-degenerate messages to both of them. In the example, fixing
the mechanism of one principal, we can hence construct a deviation to an indirect mechanism of
the other principal and an induced equilibrium of the agents’ game, generating a profile of decisions
which cannot be reproduced by a deviation to a direct mechanism and an associated truthful report
for the agents.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on equilibrium characterization in
competing-mechanism games. Several game-theoretic examples have shown that direct mechanisms
fail to provide a full characterization of equilibrium outcomes. To get the result, however, they
crucially exploit either the fact that each agent participates with many principals at a time (Peters,
2001; Martimort and Stole, 2002), or that an agent participating with a given principal can also
communicate with the principals who post the competing mechanisms (Epstein and Peters, 1999).
We instead consider competing mechanisms under exclusive competition. That is, agents participate
with at most one principal and their communication decisions are restricted: each type of each agent
sends informative messages only to the principal it participates with. In this context, we show the
existence of equilibrium outcomes that cannot be supported by direct mechanisms.
Another key issue for equilibrium characterization is whether equilibria supported by direct
mechanisms are robust against principals’ deviations towards indirect ones. A positive result in this
direction is provided by Peters (2003) under common agency. He shows that, in single-agent models
of nonexclusive competition, a principal cannot profitably deviate from a pure strategy, truth-
telling, equilibrium by using arbitrary indirect mechanisms.2 The result does not typically extend
to multiple agents.3 An exception is provided by Han (2007) who considers competing-mechanism
games of complete information, and shows that each strongly robust equilibrium outcome of the
direct mechanism game survives against principals’ unilateral deviations to indirect mechanisms.
2See Theorem 2 in Peters (2003).
3Peters (2004) and Attar et al. (2012) provide examples of multiple-agent settings with moral hazard in which
agents participate with all principals at a time and equilibria supported by direct mechanisms fail to be robust.
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We extend Han (2007) analysis to the incomplete information case by proving a robustness result for
exclusive competition settings. Truth-telling strongly robust equilibria survive against principals’
deviations to more complex communication schemes. In a similar exclusive competition framework,
Peck (1997) reaches a negative conclusion: given the mixed strategy of one principal, his opponent
can post a mechanism inducing a continuation equilibrium which cannot be reproduced when agents
behave truthfully. Our Proposition 1 hence clarifies that Peck (1997)’s insight fundamentally relies
on principals playing mixed strategies at equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a general model of competing mechanisms
under exclusive competition. Section 3 provides an example showing the limited power of direct
mechanisms. Section 4 proves equilibrium robustness, and clarifies the role of exclusive competition.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
We refer to a scenario in which several principals (indexed by j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J}) contract with
several agents (indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}). Each agent i has private information about her
type ωi ∈ Ωi. Each Ωi is taken to be finite, and we let p (ω) be the probability of the array of types
ω =
(
ω1, . . . , ωI
) ∈ Ω = ×
i∈I
Ωi.
We let xj ∈ Xj be a decision available to principal j, with Xj being a finite set for every j ∈ J .
Similarly, aij ∈ Aij = {Y,N} represents the decision of agent i to participate with principal j, in
which N stands for not participating. We take vj : X ×A×Ω→ R and ui : X ×A×Ω→ R to be
the payoff functions of principal j and of agent i, respectively, with X = ×
j∈J
Xj and A = ×
i∈I
×
j∈J
Aij .
Communication occurs via the public mechanisms posted by principals, and via the messages
sent by agents: each agent i sends a private message mij ∈ M ij to principal j. We let each M ij be
finite, include the element {∅} corresponding to the information “agent i does not communicate
with principal j”, and be sufficiently rich that Ωi ⊂M ij for every i and every j.4
Each principal perfectly observes the set of agents who participate with him. Hence, prin-
cipal j can make his decisions contingent on the array of messages mj he receives, with mj =(
m1j ,m
2
j , . . . ,m
I
j
) ∈Mj = ×
i∈I
M ij , and on the array of participation decisions aj =
(
a1j , a
2
j , . . . , a
I
j
) ∈
Aj = ×
i∈I
Aij = {Y,N}|I|. Formally, we say that a mechanism posted by principal j is a mapping
γj : Mj×Aj → ∆ (Xj). We refer to γj (mj , aj) as to the probability distribution over Xj induced by
the array of messages and actions (mj , aj), and to γj (xj |mj , aj) as to the probability that γj(mj , aj)
assigns to the decision xj ∈ Xj . We let Γj be the set of mechanisms available to principal j, and
denote Γ = ×
j∈J
Γj . Observe that each Γj = (∆ (Xj))|Mj×Aj | is compact in the product topology.
4This framework can be extended to situations in which the relevant sets of types, messages, and decisions are
infinite. See, for example, the complete information setting of Han (2007).
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The competing-mechanism game unfolds as follows. First, principals simultaneously commit to
mechanisms, next agents’ types are drawn. Given the observed mechanisms γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γJ) and
having received their private types ω =
(
ω1, . . . , ωI
)
, agents simultaneously take a participation
and a communication decision with every principal. After the agents’ choices have been made,
principals’ decisions are implemented, lotteries realize and payoffs are distributed.
A pure strategy for principal j is hence a mechanism γj ∈ Γj , and a mixed strategy is a
probability distribution over Γj . A strategy for each agent i associates to every profile of posted
mechanisms a joint participation and communication decision, for each value of her type. Exclusive
competition implies that each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and
meaningfully communicate only with him. The following assumption captures this restriction.
Assumption E. The set of participation and communication decisions for each agent i is
Si =
{
(mi, ai) ∈ M i × Ai : aij = Y for at most one j and mij = ∅ iff aij = N
}
, with M i = ×
j∈J
M ij
and Ai = ×
j∈J
Aij .
Under Assumption E, a strategy for agent i is a measurable mapping, λi : Γ × Ωi → ∆ (Si), that
associates to each type and to each array of posted mechanisms a probability distribution over such
restricted decisions. We denote λi
(
γ, ωi
)
the joint probability distribution over
(
mi, ai
) ∈ Si for
agent i of type ωi given γ, and λi
(
mi, ai|γ, ωi) the (joint) probability assigned to the pair (mi, ai)
by λi(mi, ai). The corresponding expected payoff to type ωi of agent i is:
U i
(
γ, λ;ωi
)
=
∑
Ω−i
∑
M×A
∑
X
ui
(
x, a, ωi, ω−i
) ∏
j∈J
γj (xj |mj , aj)
∏
h∈I
λh
(
mh, ah|γ, ωh
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
(1)
where λ =
(
λ1, λ2, . . . , λI
)
, and p
(
ω−i|ωi) is the conditional probability of ω−i given ωi.
Similarly, the expected payoff to principal j when he plays γj against his opponents’ strategies γ−j
and the agents’ strategy profile λ is given by:
Vj (γj , γ−j , λ) =
∑
Ω
∑
A
∑
X
vj (x, a, ω)
∑
M
∏
k∈J
γk (xk |mk, ak )
∏
i∈I
λi
(
mi, ai|γ, ωi
)
p (ω) . (2)
We let GΓ be the competing-mechanism game induced by a given Γ.5 As in Epstein and Peters
(1999) and Han (2007), we focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game GΓ in
which principals play pure strategies. The strategies (γ, λ) constitute an SPNE of GΓ if:
1. λ is a continuation equilibrium. That is, for every γ ∈ Γ, the strategies (λi, λ−i) constitute a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the agents’ game induced by γ;
5Observe that in the game GΓ mechanisms are defined over M × A, not only on S. This is done to consider
situations in which Assumption E does not hold, as it is the case for Example 1 in Section 4.
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2. given γ−j and λ, γj ∈ argmax
γ′j∈Γj
Vj
(
γ′j , γ−j , λ
)
for every j ∈ J .
A mechanism available to principal j is direct if agents can only communicate their types to
principal j, i.e. if M ij = Ωi ∪ {∅} for every i, with {∅} representing no communication. We denote
γ˜j : ×
i∈I
(
Ωi ∪ {∅})×{Y,N}|I| → ∆ (Xj) a direct mechanism for principal j, and we let ΓDj ⊆ Γj be
the corresponding set of direct mechanisms.6 Thus, γ˜j (ωj , aj) denotes the probability distribution
over Xj induced by the array of reports ωj to principal j and by the participation decisions aj he
observes.
We let GD be the game in which principals are restricted to direct mechanisms. In GD, agents
can only communicate their types to principals. For a given array of mechanism γ−j posted by his
opponents, a direct mechanism γ˜j is incentive compatible from the point of view of principal j if it
induces an equilibrium in the agents’ game in which each type of each agent who participates with
principal j is truthful to him. Thus, γ˜j can be incentive compatible for the array γ−j , but not for
some other array γ ′−j 6= γ−j .7
2.2 Applications
Our general model encompasses standard economic applications of exclusive competition with in-
complete information, as illustrated below.
Competing Auctions
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1993) analyzes sellers who compete over auctions when buyers’ val-
uation constitute their private information. Peters (1997) shows that in a decentralized market
with many sellers and buyers, second-price auctions with reserve price equal to marginal cost arise
as equilibrium mechanisms. In these settings, sellers simultaneously and anonymously post auc-
tions and each type of each buyer chooses at most one auction to participate in. A seller only
receives relevant messages from the buyers who participate in his auction, which guarantees that
Assumption E is satisfied. Each seller j is assumed to post direct mechanisms, that associate to
the valuations reported by each type ωi ∈ Ωi = [0, 1] of each buyer i ∈ I who participates in his
auction a trading probability and an expected price. A pure strategy for seller j is a mechanism
γ˜j : 2|I| × ([0, 1] ∪ ∅)|I| → [0, 1]|Ij | × R|Ij |, with Ij ⊆ I being the set of buyers participating in
auction j and with the assumption that a buyer who does not participate with principal j can only
send him the ∅ message. At equilibrium, buyers behave truthfully: given its participation decision,
it is a dominant strategy for each type of each buyer to truthfully report its private valuation in
6Since Ωi ⊂M ij for each i and j, a direct mechanism γ˜j could be specified as a (degenerate) indirect one in which,
for each mj 6∈ Ω, γ˜j (mj , a) = γ˜j (ω, a) for some ω ∈ Ω. That is, as in Peters (2001) and Han (2007), allowing for
additional messages does not enlarge the set of principal j’s decisions made available by γ˜j .
7This possibility is already acknowledged in the competing-mechanism setting introduced by Myerson (1982, p.77).
See also McAfee (1993, p. 1288).
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a second-price auction. Furthermore, when considering seller j’s deviations, attention is restricted
to mechanisms inducing truthful reports to the deviator.8 Finally, equilibria are constructed in
such a way that, if a seller deviates to a new auction mechanism, then buyers coordinate their
participation decisions selecting the most favourable continuation equilibrium for the deviator.9
The model of this section also adapts to the competing auctions settings of Peters and Severinov
(1997), Burguet and Sakovics (1999), Viràg (2010), Han (2015), Peck (2015).
Competitive Insurance
In their canonical analysis, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) study strategic competition between
insurance companies for the exclusive right to serve several ex-ante identical agents. Each agent’s
type space is Ω =
{
ωL, ωH
}
. Uncertainty is idiosyncratic: each customer faces a binary risk on her
endowment e ∈ {eb, eg}. Let fb(ω) be the probability of the individual state b for an agent of type
ω ∈ Ω, and fg(ω) = 1 − fb(ω). These random variables are independently distributed across all
agents and identically distributed across agents of the same type. Each agent privately observes her
type. The payoff to an agent of type ω is fb(ω)u(eb+db)+(1− fb (ω))u(eg+dg), where (db, dg) ∈ R2
is the state-contingent coverage purchased from the company it participates with. Attention is
restricted to the game in which insurers post (deterministic) direct mechanisms which assign to
each agent a pair of state-contingent insurance contracts, as a function of her participation decision
and declared type. In addition, such mechanisms induce agents to be truthful to the company
they participate with.10 Communication is only allowed between each insurer and its customers,
implying that Assumption E is satisfied.
Competitive Search
The model above has been subsequently extended to analyze the interaction between pricing and
trading probability. Inderst and Wambach (2002) study a competitive market in which privately
informed workers apply to firms who face capacity constraints, and may therefore end up being
rationed. The type set of each worker is Ω =
{
ωL, ωH
}
, and ωH is the high-ability type. Firms
compete by offering price-quantity contracts and workers apply to at most one firm. A single
worker can only communicate with a firm when applying for its vacancies. Assumption E is hence
satisfied if we interpret the application decision as participation. Each firm faces an exogenous
8See, as a reference, McAfee (1993, p. 1288), and Peters (1997, pp. 101-102).
9This equilibrium restriction first appears in the competing sellers framework of McAfee (1993, pp. 1288-1290).
In the words of Peters and Severinov (1997): “McAfee makes the optimistic assumption that buyers will select
the deviator with a probability that maximizes the deviator’s profit (subject to the constraint that buyers remain
indifferent between the deviator’s mechanism and the fixed alternative payoff).” The same restriction is, for instance,
incorporated in the notion of competitive distribution of auctions in Peters (1997, pp.109-110), and Han (2015, p.
209).
10This setting can alternatively be formulated in a screening context. In the spirit of the taxation principle (Rochet
(1985)), insurers are assumed to post menus including at most two non-degenerate insurance contracts. A menu posted
by insurer j provides each agent with the same opportunities she can achieve when adopting a truthful behavior with
him.
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limit l > 0 to her hiring capacity. Hence, for a given application decision and a given type, a
worker’s payoff depends on the contract posted by the firm she applies for and on the relevant
rationing probability, which is in turn determined by the application decisions of all workers. The
competitive search literature endogenizes this rationing as a byproduct of search frictions and
bilateral matching (Guerrieri et al., 2010; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010). Under competitive search,
principals simultaneously post direct mechanisms and each agent applies to at most one of them.
A direct mechanism is a mapping γ˜j : 2|I| × (Ω ∪ ∅)|I| → Xj , with the additional feature that
the implemented decision xj ∈ Xj only depends on the number of applications rather than on the
identity of the applicants (anonimity). The ratio between the number of principals posting a given
mechanism γ and the number of agents applying for it determines the rationing probability µ (γ),
which every type of every agent takes as given. On the principals’ side, attention is restricted
to (direct) mechanisms which induce agents to truthfully report their private information on the
equilibrium path. Equilibria are characterized by only considering a subset of all possible principals’
deviations, that is, those inducing truth-telling to the deviator.11 Eventually, for every deviation γ˜′j
inducing multiple equilibria among agents, the literature follows McAfee (1993) in assuming that
the deviator is optimistic, believing that agents will coordinate on the equilibrium which is most
favourable to him.12
Competing Hierarchies
The literature on competition between manufacturer-retailer hierarchies developed, among others,
by Martimort (1996) and Gal-Or (1997) considers manufacturers who produce differentiated inter-
mediate goods to be sold to retailers for trade in the consumption markets.13 Retailers hold private
information on market conditions and each of them is exogenously assigned to only one manufac-
turer. Strategic interactions between retailers arise because the demand price faced by a retailer of
hierarchy j depends on the final output of all hierarchies. A manufacturer only communicates with
the retailers in his hierarchy, thus Assumption E is satisfied. At equilibrium, each manufacturer
j proposes a direct mechanism that assigns a price-quantity pair (pj (ω) , qj (ω)) to each type of
retailer of his hierarchy who truthfully reports its type ω. When deviating, each manufacturer j
anticipates that all retailers in his hierarchy will be truthful to him.14 Such framework can hence
be seen as a particular case of our general model in which it is a strictly dominant strategy for every
type of every agent to participate with only one principal. This specification, however, minimizes
11See, among others, Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010, p. 1829).
12In these settings, multiple equilibria typically originate from agents’ participation choices. In Eeckhout and
Kircher (2010, p. 1361), multiplicity is resolved by letting informed buyers coordinate on the queue length that is
best for the deviating seller. In the “market for lemons” scenario analyzed by Gottardi and Auster (2016, pp. 10-11),
each buyer expects, in case of multiplicity, that sellers select his preferred buyer/seller ratio.
13Different strands of the literature investigate the link between pre-commitment effects and renegotiation (Caillaud
et al., 1995), the rationale behind alternative forms of vertical restraints (Gal-Or, 1991), the welfare implications of
information sharing (Pagnozzi and Piccolo, 2013). See Rey and Vergé (2008) for a survey.
14See, for example, Martimort and Piccolo (2010, p. 209).
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the relevant strategic effects of competition over mechanisms under exclusivity.
Despite its large domain of applicability, our analysis does not incorporate exclusive dealing
models (O’Brien and Shaffer, 1997; Bernheim and Whinston, 1998), which evaluate the role of
exclusive contracts in contexts in which agents’ participation choices are, in principle, unrestricted
and Assumption E is typically not satisfied.
2.3 A strategic foundation for exclusive competition
The notion of direct mechanism we refer to reflects the restriction imposed in economic applications:
agents only need to report their exogenous type. The above discussion has, in addition, identified
three key features of the characterizations provided in such applications.
a) Each principal posts an incentive compatible mechanism at equilibrium.
b) Attention is restricted to such mechanisms when examining unilateral deviations. That is, a
deviating principal anticipates that every agent participating with him behaves truthfully.
c) If a deviation induces multiple equilibria over agents’ participation decisions, the most favor-
able one for the deviating principal is selected.
We here formalize these restrictions in the context of a competing mechanism game introducing
the notion of truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium for the direct mechanism game GD. A truth-
telling equilibrium
(
γ˜, λ˜
)
is an SPNE of GD in which agents are truthful to principals on path.
That is, given (γ˜j , γ˜−j), the agents’ equilibrium strategies
(
λ˜i, λ˜−i
)
prescribe that every type of
every agent is truthful to the principal it participates with. In other words, from the point of view
of each principal j, the mechanism γ˜j is incentive compatible given the mechanisms γ˜−j posted by
his opponents. This concept imposes no restrictions on agents’ behaviors following any principal’s
deviation. A strongly robust equilibrium (γ˜, λ˜) is an SPNE of GD, in which for every j ∈ J ,
Vj
(
γ˜j , γ˜−j , λ˜
)
≥ Vj
(
γ˜′j , γ˜−j , λ˜
′) ∀γ˜′j ∈ ΓDj ,∀λ˜′, (3)
with λ˜′ being a continuation equilibrium relative to
(
γ˜′j , γ˜−j
)
. Hence, in a strongly robust equilib-
rium no principal has an individually profitable deviation regardless of the equilibrium selected by
agents in the game induced by the deviation.15
The remaining of this paper evaluates the rationale for letting principals post direct mechanisms,
and for restricting to truth-telling strongly robust equilibria. Specifically, we show that any such
equilibrium is robust against unilateral deviations to indirect mechanisms. In establishing the result
we show that players’ decisions induced by every such deviation can be reproduced by a deviation
15In competing-mechanism settings, this notion has first been introduced by Epstein and Peters (1999), and then
applied to single-agent contexts by Peters (2001) and to multiple-agent contexts by Han (2007).
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to a direct mechanism and an induced equilibrium in which agents are truthful to the deviator.
This reconciles our strategic approach with all three features exhibited by economic applications.
3 Direct mechanisms under exclusive competition
This section establishes that there exist pure strategy equilibrium outcomes of some game GΓ that
cannot be supported in the corresponding direct mechanism game GD.
Consider a version of the competitive insurance model described in Section 2.2. There are two
identical principals (insurers) who compete for the exclusive right to serve two identical agents (cos-
tumers). An insurer can provide a state-contingent coverage (db, dg) ∈ D to each of the customers
who participate with him. The set of feasible insurance contracts D ⊂ R2+ is compact. The payoff
to type ω ∈
{
ωL, ωH
}
of each agent i = 1, 2 is
U (db, dg;ω) = fb (ω)u (eb + db) + (1− fb (ω))u (eg + dg) , (4)
with (eb, eg) such that eb < eg being its state-contingent endowment.16 For each ω, the function
U(., .;ω) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly quasi-concave and the standard single-crossing
property is satisfied. We let ωH be the “high risk” type: one hence has fb(ωH) > fb(ωL) for each
agent.
The corresponding payoff that each principal j = 1, 2 earns on each agent of type ω he serves is
− (fb (ω) db + (1− fb (ω)) dg).17 We say that
(
d∗b(ω), d∗g(ω)
)
is a fairly priced full insurance contract
for type ω ∈ {ωL, ωH} if eb + d∗b(ω) = eg + d∗g(ω) and −fb (ω) d∗b(ω)− (1− fb (ω)) d∗g(ω) = 0. Since
fb
(
ωH
)
> fb
(
ωL
)
, we also have that −fb
(
ωH
)
d∗b(ωL)−
(
1− fb
(
ωH
))
d∗g(ωL) < 0: the contract(
d∗b(ωL), d∗g(ωL)
)
yields losses to principals when it is traded by a high risk type.
In such a scenario, a natural candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium is the Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) allocation. That is, each high risk type of each agent gets the full insurance con-
tract
(
d∗b(ωH), d∗g(ωH)
)
from the company it participates with, its incentive constraint binds, and
companies earn zero profit on each traded contract.
We show that, if principals can use arbitrary indirect mechanisms, additional outcomes can
be supported at equilibrium. Consider, in particular, the situation in which each type of each
agent participates with the same principal, say P1, and focus on the monopolistic allocation
characterized by Stiglitz (1977), and Schlee and Chade (2012). In this allocation, each low risk
type ωL is left at its reservation utility. That is, the coverage (dMb (ωL), dMg (ωL)) is such that
U(dMb (ωL), dMg (ωL);ωL) = U(0, 0, ωL) = fb(ωL)u(eb) + (1 − fb(ωL))u(eg). The coverage for each
high risk type (dMb (ωH), dMg (ωH)) is such that her incentive constraint binds and it ends up being
16Since, for a given type and for a given coverage, agent 1 and 2 have the same (expected) payoff, we do not specify
the superscript i in equation (4) to simplify exposition.
17When the number of agents gets large, this becomes a standard model of competitive economies under adverse
selection (Bisin and Gottardi, 2006).
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fully insured. That is, U(dMb (ωH), dMg (ωH);ωH) = U(dMb (ωL), dMg (ωL);ωH), with eb + db(ωH) =
eg + dg(ωH). This in turn guarantees that −(fb(ω)dMb (ω) + (1− fb(ω))dMg (ω)) > 0 for each ω.
This outcome can be supported in a pure strategy equilibrium of a competing-mechanism game
GΓ in which each agent’s message set contains, beyond her individual types and the degenerate
message ∅, the two additional messages m and m′. Specifically, let P1 propose the following
mechanism:
i) if both agents participate with him sending a pair of messages (ω, ω˜) ∈
{
ωL, ωH
}2
, he provides
the coverages
(
dMb (ω) , dMg (ω)
)
and
(
dMb (ω˜) , dMg (ω˜)
)
, respectively;
ii) if both agents participate with him sending a pair of messages in the set {m,m′}2, he provides
the coverage
(
dˆb(ωL), dˆg(ωL)
)
= argmax
d∈D
U(db, dg;ωL) to each agent sending m, and the
coverage
(
dˆb(ωH), dˆg(ωH)
)
= argmax
d∈D
U(db, dg;ωH) to each agent sending m′;
iii) for every other combination of participation choices and messages, he provides the coverage(
dMb (ω) , dMg (ω)
)
to the agent sending the message ω and the coverage db (∅) = dg (∅) = 0 to
the agent sending the messages m,m′ or ∅.
In addition, let the other principal P2 offer the null coverage db (∅) = dg (∅) = 0 for every partici-
pation and communication choices.
Given these mechanisms, there is an equilibrium of the agents’ game in which each type of each
agent participates with P1 and truthfully reveals its private information.18 Clearly, P1 has no
incentive to deviate since he is earning the monopolistic profit. We therefore only have to consider
deviations of P2.
Consider then the continuation game induced by a deviation of P2 to some mechanism γ′2. If
type ωL(ωH) of an agent participates with P1 sending him the message m(m′), then any type
ω ∈ {ωL, ωH} of the other agent can get its maximal payoff U
(
dˆb(ω), dˆg(ω);ω
)
by sending the
message m if ω = ωL, or m′ if ω = ωH , to P1. For each γ′2 there is hence an equilibrium in which
each type ω of each agent participates with P1 and receives the contract dˆ(ω). We then construct
the agents’ equilibrium strategies so that, following any such P2’s deviation, each type ωL(ωH)
participates with P1 sending the message m(m′). Thus, there is no deviation in which P2 can
profitably attract at least one agent.
We now show that the same monopolistic coverage cannot be supported at equilibrium in GD,
in which principals post direct mechanisms. When posting a (deterministic) direct mechanism, a
principal provides a coverage (db (ω), dg(ω)) to each agent who participates with him and reports
ω ∈ {ωL, ωH}, and the null coverage (db(∅), dg(∅)) = (0, 0) to each agent who does not participate
with him. For P1 to achieve the above monopolistic allocation, he must provide the coverages
18This follows from i) and from the fact that, by construction, the monopolistic allocation is incentive compatible.
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(dMb (ω), dMg (ω)) and (dMb (ω˜), dMg (ω˜)) when the reported types are (ω, ω˜).19 To show that P2 has
a profitable deviation, observe that, by continuity and single crossing of each U (., .;ω) function,
there exists a pair of insurance contracts
(
d′b
(
ωL
)
, d′g
(
ωL
))
, and
(
d′b
(
ωH
)
, d′g
(
ωH
))
in a neighborhood,
respectively, of
(
dMb
(
ωL
)
, dMg
(
ωL
))
and
(
dMb
(
ωH
)
, dMg
(
ωH
))
such that:
U
(
d′b
(
ωL
)
, d′g
(
ωL
)
;ωL
)
> max
{
U
(
dMb
(
ωL
)
, dMg
(
ωL
)
;ωL
)
, U
(
d′b
(
ωH
)
, d′g
(
ωH
)
;ωL
)}
,
(5)
and
U
(
d′b
(
ωH
)
, d′g
(
ωH
)
;ωH
)
> max
{
U
(
dMb
(
ωH
)
, dMg
(
ωH
)
;ωH
)
, U
(
d′b
(
ωL
)
, d′g
(
ωL
)
;ωH
)}
(6)
for each agent. That is, each type ω strictly prefers to purchase
(
d′b(ω), d′g(ω)
)
rather than(
d′b(ω′), d′g(ω′)
)
which is designed to attract type ω′. Its corresponding payoff is greater than
the equilibrium one. In addition, the continuity of insurer’s profits guarantees that these contracts
can be chosen so that:
−fb (ω) d′b (ω) +
(
1− fb (ω) d′g (ω)
)
> 0 (7)
for every ω ∈
{
ωL, ωH
}
. Suppose now that P2 deviates to the direct mechanism which provides
the coverage (d′b(ω), d′g(ω)) to every agent who participates with him and reports ω. Following
P2’s deviation, there is no equilibrium of the agents’ game in which both agents participate with
P1. Indeed, if one of them does so, (5) and (6) guarantee that the other one strictly prefers to
participate with P2. In any equilibrium, at least one agent will therefore participate with P2 with
a strictly positive probability. Then, (5) and (6) guarantee that each type of this agent will be
truthful to P2. By (7), the deviation yields P2 a strictly positive profit. The result obtains for
every possible specification of P1’s direct mechanism when only one agent participates with him.
1. The example shows that a monopolistic allocation can arise at equilibrium in a standard insur-
ance setting with exclusive competition. This obtains by letting principals use indirect mechanisms,
but the same allocation cannot be supported in an equilibrium of GD. The (equilibrium) indirect
mechanism of P1 makes available a system of threats that allow agents to punish his opponent
when he attempts at profitably deviating. Indeed, following any such deviation, there is an equilib-
rium of the agents’ game that keeps P2 excluded from trade and yields every type ω the coverage
(dˆb(ω), dˆg(ω)). Importantly, the threats are effective despite the exclusive nature of competition,
captured by Assumption E. Direct mechanisms turn out not to be flexible enough to reproduce all
these threats, which shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes they can support. In this respect, the
example extends to exclusive competition contexts the general intuition provided by Peters (2001)
19As we clarify in the text, our argument does not require to specify the direct mechanism of P1 for the case in
which only one agent participates with him. We therefore omit this specification to simplify exposition.
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and Martimort and Stole (2002) in single-agent, nonexclusive frameworks. Yet, our result crucially
exploits the presence of several agents. If there was only one agent, the threats generated by the
indirect mechanism posted by P1 at equilibrium would not be effective. Indeed, if P1’s mecha-
nism makes available the coverage (dˆb(ω), dˆg(ω)), then type ω of the agent would simply send the
corresponding message on the equilibrium path.20
2. The equilibrium (indirect) mechanism of P1 can be naturally interpreted as a recommendation
mechanism in the sense of Yamashita (2010). In a recommendation mechanism, agents report their
types to each principal they participate with, and recommend him a specific direct mechanism to
post. In this interpretation, the mechanism of P1 induces agents to recommend him, on the equi-
librium path, to provide (dMb (ω), dMg (ω)) to each agent declaring to be of type ω. The equilibrium
is supported by the following out-of-equilibrium behaviors: each type ω of each agent participates
with P1 and recommends him to post the direct mechanism yielding the payoff U(dˆb(ω), dˆg(ω);ω)
to each type ω. These threats sustain P2’s exclusion from trade at equilibrium.21
3. The example does not attempt at providing a characterization of the equilibria of GD. Yet, as
argued above, the allocation characterized by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) can be supported in
a pure strategy equilibrium of GD. In this case, on the equilibrium path, each high risk type of
each agent is indifferent between its equilibrium (full) coverage and that purchased by each low
risk type. Were a high risk type switching to this alternative insurance policy, the insurer who
trades it with some low risk types would incur losses. Such an (optimal) behavior of high risk
type customers is hence not compatible with a pure strategy equilibrium. Hence agents coordinate
on the continuation equilibrium which is more favorable to the active principals, in line with the
strong robustness requirement introduced in Section 2.3.
4. The example is built in a standard insurance setting in which principals (insurers) are restricted
to deterministic mechanisms. This may raise the question of whether indirect mechanisms still
allow to support additional equilibria when stochastic mechanisms are allowed. In the example,
intuition suggests that the profitability of P2’s deviation in the game GD does not depend on the
randomness associated to the threats of P1. A full-fledged example documenting this result in the
presence of stochastic mechanisms is provided in Attar et al. (2015).
Overall, the example shows that restricting principals to direct mechanisms involves a loss of
generality even in exclusive competition contexts. The result a fortiori applies to the truth-telling,
strongly robust equilibria of GD which have been considered in the literature. A possible rationale
for the restriction to such equilibria is provided in the next section.
20For a general analysis of the role of direct mechanisms in exclusive competition settings with a single agent, see
the working paper version (Attar et al., 2015).
21Yamashita (2010)’s analys is casted in an abstract multi-principal multi-agent setting in which agents participate
and communicate with all principals. In his construction, a mechanism is implemented by a principal if it receives the
majority of agents’ recommendations (votes). He then shows that, if there are at least three agents, recommendation
mechanisms can be used to establish a folk-theorem.
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4 Robustness
From the viewpoint of applications, an important issue is whether truth-telling strongly robust
equilibrium outcomes survive to a principal deviating towards general indirect mechanisms. A
positive answer to this question would provide some foundation for the restrictions made in economic
models of exclusive competition. We establish such a result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Consider any truth-telling, strongly robust equilibrium of the game GD in which
principals play pure strategies. Then, under Assumption E, the corresponding outcome can be
supported in an equilibrium of any game GΓ in which principals play pure strategies.
Proof Let
(
γ˜∗, λ˜∗
)
be a truth-telling, strongly robust equilibrium of GD and let V˜ ∗j and U˜
∗i
be the equilibrium payoffs for every principal j ∈ J and every agent i ∈ I. We show that the
corresponding outcome, that is, the probability distributions over players’ decisions given agents’
types induced by (γ˜∗, λ˜∗) can be supported at equilibrium in any game GΓ.
Specifically, fix a GΓ game and let principals post the (degenerate) indirect mechanisms γ˜∗ =(
γ˜∗j , γ˜∗−j
)
and agents play according to the strategies such that:
a.) λ∗i
(
γ, ωi
)
= λ˜∗i
(
γ, ωi
) ∀i,∀ωi and ∀γ ∈ ΓD ⊆ Γ,
b.) λ∗ (γ, ω) is an equilibrium of the agents’ game induced by γ = (γj , γ−j) ∀ω and ∀γ 6∈ ΓD.
Thus, in the “enlarged” game in which all mechanisms are feasible, each type ωi of each agent i
takes the same participation and communication decisions that it was taking at the original truth-
telling equilibrium of GD, when an array of (direct) mechanisms is posted. When, instead, at least
one principal posts an indirect mechanism, we let agents coordinate on an arbitrary equilibrium.
To develop the proof, we focus on the situation in which a principal, say the j-th one, unilaterally
deviates to some γ ′j ∈ Γj , and consider the agents’ game induced by the mechanisms
(
γ′j , γ˜∗−j
)
. It
is convenient to represent the equilibrium behavior of each type ωi of each agent i in this game in
terms of the probability distributions over communication and participation decisions. That is, we
denote:
λ∗i
(
γ ′j , γ˜
∗
−j , ω
i
)
= µ∗i
(
.
∣∣∣aij , ai−j , γ ′j , γ˜∗−j , ωi)⊗ pi∗i (.|γ ′j , γ˜∗−j , ωi) , (8)
in which µ∗i
(
.|aij , ai−j , γ ′j , γ˜∗−j , ωi
)
represents the conditional equilibrium probability distribution
over the message profiles
(
mij ,m
i−j
)
that type ωi of agent i uses if it chooses the participation deci-
sions
(
aij , a
i−j
)
with a strictly positive probability, and pi∗i
(
.|γ ′j , γ˜∗−j , ωi
)
represents its (marginal)
equilibrium probability distribution over participation decisions ai =
(
aij , a
i−j
)
. The following
lemma makes use of this representation to establish a characterization result that is key to our
argument.
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Lemma 1 Fix a principal j and let principals −j post the direct mechanisms γ˜−j ∈ ΓD−j. For
each mechanism γ′j ∈ Γj posted by principal j, let (µ¯, p¯i) be an equilibrium of the agents’ game
induced by
(
γ′j , γ˜−j
)
. Then, under Assumption E, there exists a γ˜ ′j ∈ ΓDj and an equilibrium (µ˜, p¯i)
of the agents’ game induced by
(
γ˜ ′j , γ˜−j
)
, which reproduce the same probability distribution over
principals’ decisions as the one implied by (γ′j , γ˜−j) and (µ¯, p¯i). In particular, µ˜ prescribes to each
type ωi of each agent i to be truthful to principal j when it participates with him.
Proof Suppose that, given the mechanisms γ˜−j ∈ ΓD−j , principal j posts the mechanism γ ′j ∈ Γj .
In the induced game between agents, let p¯i =
(
p¯i1, . . . , p¯i I
)
be an (equilibrium) distribution over
participation, with p¯i i = p¯i i
(
.|γ′j , γ˜−j , ωi
)
, and µ¯ =
(
µ¯1, . . . , µ¯ I
)
be an (equilibrium) conditional
distribution over messages, with µ¯ i = µ¯ i
(
.|ai, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωi
)
, for every ai in the support of p¯ii, and
for every i ∈ I.
Given the mechanisms
(
γ′j , γ˜−j
)
, for each ω ∈ Ω and for each aj which is played with positive
probability in p¯i, let Iω
(
aj ; γ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
be the subset of types that participate with principal j,
and I¯ω
(
aj ; γ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
be the subset of those who do not participate with principal j when aj
is chosen. Hence, the sets Iω
(
aj ; γ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
and I¯ω
(
aj ; γ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
partition the profile of types
ω = (ω1, ..., ωI) in terms of their equilibrium participation decisions p¯i. Let h be a generic element
of Iω
(
aj ; γ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
, indicating that type ωh of agent h participates with principal j. Analogously,
let k be a generic element of I¯ω
(
aj ; γ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
.
We construct the direct mechanism γ˜′j ∈ ΓDj such that:
γ˜′j (ωj , aj) =
∑
Mj
∑
M−j
(∏
i∈I
µ¯ i
(
mij ,m
i
−j
∣∣∣ai, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωi)
)
γ′j (mj , aj) , (9)
for each ωj ∈ ×
i∈I
(
Ωi ∪ {∅}), and for every aj ∈ Aj played with positive probability in p¯i. For
every ai not in the support of p¯i i, we let µ¯ i
(
.|ai, γ′j , γ˜−j , ωi
)
be any arbitrary distribution over M ij .
Recall that since γ˜−j ∈ ΓD−j , we have that M ij′ = Ωi ∪ {∅} for every j′ 6= j and for every i.
We now consider the game played by types
(
ω1, . . . , ωI
)
given the mechanisms
(
γ˜′j , γ˜−j
)
. The
remaining of the proof is organized in two steps.
Step 1. Let each type participate according to
(
p¯i1, . . . , p¯iI
)
, and communicate according to
µ˜h
(
ωh|γ˜′j , γ˜−j , ωh
)
= 1 for every h ∈ Iω
(
aj ; γ˜ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
, and according to µ˜k
(
.|γ˜′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
=
µ¯ k
(
.|γ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
for every k ∈ I¯ω
(
aj ; γ˜ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
. We show that these behaviors reproduce the
probability distribution over principals’ decisions induced by γ′j and (µ¯, p¯i).
By assumption, Iω
(
aj ; γ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
= Iω
(
aj ; γ˜ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
= Iω for every ω, and I¯ω
(
aj ; γ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
=
I¯ω
(
aj ; γ˜ ′j , γ˜−j , p¯i
)
= I¯ω. Assumption E implies that, for each aj played with positive probability
in p¯i, the decisions selected by γ˜′j for different reported types ωj only depend on the messages that
principal j receives from types in Iω, since all types in I¯ω send him the (constant) empty message.
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Thus, for every ωj and given γ˜−j , γ˜′j reproduces the probability distribution over principal j’s
decisions induced by γ ′j and (µ¯, p¯i) if each type in Iω is truthful to him. We can therefore write the
right-hand side of (9) as:
∑
Mj
∑
M−j
γ′j (mj , aj)
∏
h∈Iω
µ¯ h
(
mhj , ∅|ah, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωh
) ∏
k∈I¯ω
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
=
=
∑
Mj
γ′j (mj , aj)
∏
h∈Iω
µ¯ h
(
mhj , ∅|ah, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωh
)
, (10)
since ∑
M−j
∏
k∈I¯ω
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
= 1. Since each k ∈ I¯ω keeps sending messages to
principals−j according to µ¯k, the mechanisms
(
γ˜′j , γ˜−j
)
, and the agents’ behaviors (µ˜, p¯i) implement
the same probability distribution over all principals’ decisions as that implied by
(
γ′j , γ˜−j
)
and
(µ¯, p¯i).
Step 2. We show that participating according to
(
p¯i1, . . . , p¯iI
)
and communicating according to
µ˜h
(
ωh|γ˜′j , γ˜−j , ωh
)
= 1 for every h ∈ Iω, and according to µ˜k
(
.|γ˜′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
= µ¯ k
(
.|γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
for every k ∈ I¯ω, constitute an equilibrium.
We first reformulate the implication of the previous step in terms of payoffs. Recall first that the
expected equilibrium payoff of type ωi of agent i in the game induced by
(
γ′j , γ˜−j
)
is
U i
(
γ′j , γ˜−j , (µ¯, p¯i) ;ωi
)
=
∑
Ω−i
∑
A
∑
Xj
∑
X−j
ui (xj , x−j , a, ω)βµ¯ (xj , x−j |a, ω) p¯i
(
a|γ ′j , γ˜−j , ω
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
,
in which we denoted
βµ¯ (xj , x−j |a, ω) ≡
∑
Mj
∑
M−j
γ˜−j (x−j |ω−j , a−j) γ′j (xj |mj , aj)
∏
t∈I
µ¯ t
(
mt
∣∣∣at, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωt)
 =
=
∑
Mj
γ ′j (xj |mj , aj)
∏
h∈Iω
µ¯ h
(
mhj , ∅|ah, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωh
) ∑
M−j
γ˜−j (x−j |ω−j , a−j)
∏
k∈I¯ω
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
=
= γ˜′j (xj |ωj , aj)
∑
M−j
γ˜−j (x−j |ω−j , a−j)
∏
k∈I¯ω
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
. (11)
Observe that the first equality in the expression for βµ¯ (xj , x−j |a, ω) obtains by (10) and Assumption
E that implies
∑
Mj
∑
M−j
γ˜−j (x−j |ω−j , a−j)
∏
t∈I
µ¯ t
(
mt
∣∣∣at, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωt) = ∑
M−j
γ˜−j (x−j |ω−j , a−j)
∏
k∈I¯ω
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
.
for each −j principal. While the second equality obtains by using (9) together with Assumption
E. Hence, the payoff to type ωi of agent i when principal j posts γ˜′j and agents play according to
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(µ˜, p¯i) is equal to her equilibrium payoff in the game induced by (γ′j , γ˜−j). Formally,
U i
(
γ′j , γ˜−j , (µ¯, p¯i) ;ωi
)
=
∑
Ω−i
∑
A
∑
Xj
u˜i (xj , a, ω, ω−j) γ˜′j (xj |ωj , aj) p¯i
(
a|γ ′j , γ˜−j , ω
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
with
u˜i (xj , a, ω, ω−j) ≡
∑
X−j
ui (xj , x−j , a, ω)
∑
M−j
γ˜−j (x−j |ω−j , a−j)
∏
k∈I¯ω
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
representing the (indirect) payoff to type ωi which incorporates the decisions of principals other
than j induced by the reports ω−j , given the participation decisions a−j .
We now develop the proof by contradiction. Suppose first that type ωi deviates to
(
bi, ωˆi
)
, with
bi ∈ supp (p¯ii) and ωˆi ∈ Ωi ∪ {∅}. Any such deviation is profitable if
∑
Ω−i
∑
A−i
∑
Xj
u˜i
(
xj , b
i, a−i, ω, ωˆ−j
)
γ˜′j
(
xj |ωˆij , ω−ij , bij , a−ij
)
p¯i−i
(
a−i|γ′j , γ˜−j , ω−i
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
>
>
∑
Ω−i
∑
A−i
∑
Xj
u˜i
(
xj , b
i, a−i, ω, ω−j
)
γ˜′j
(
xj |ωj , bij , a−ij
)
p¯i−i
(
a−i|γ ′j , γ˜−j , ω−i
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
=
= U i
(
γ′j , γ˜−j , (µ¯, p¯i) ;ωi
)
, (12)
with bij being the j-th element of bi, ωˆ−j = (ωˆi−j , ω−i−j) and
u˜i
(
xj , b
i, a−i, ω, ωˆ−j
)
≡
∑
X−j
ui
(
x, bi, a−i, ω
) ∑
M−j
γ˜−j
(
x−j |ωˆ−j , bi−j , a−i−j
) ∏
k∈I¯ω ,k 6=i
µ¯ k
(
∅,mk−j |ak, γ ′j , γ˜−j , ωk
)
.
The equality on the right-hand side of (12) holds since bi ∈ supp (p¯ii). At the deviation stage, every
type ωl 6= ωi keeps participating according to p¯il and communicating according to µ˜l. Specifically,
given Assumption E, it sends the empty message to principals other than j when participating with
principal j, and the empty message to principal j otherwise. Two cases must be then distinguished.
1.) bi is such that type ωi participates with principal j. Thus, given (9) and (10), (12) can be
rewritten as
∑
Ω−i
∑
A−i
∑
Xj
u˜i
(
xj , b
i, a−i, ω, ω−j
)∑
Mj
γ′j
(
xj |ωˆij ,m−ij , bij = Y, a−ij
) ∏
h∈Iω ,h6=i
µ¯ h
(
mhj , ∅
∣∣∣ah, γ′j , γ˜−j , ωh)
×
× p¯i−i
(
a−i|γ ′j , γ˜−j , ω−i
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
> U i
(
γ′j , γ˜−j , (µ¯, p¯i) ;ωi
)
, (13)
contradicting that (µ¯, p¯i) is an equilibrium in the game induced by
(
γ′j , γ˜−j
)
.
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2.) bi is such that type ωi does not participate with principal j. In this case, (12) becomes
∑
Ω−i
∑
A−i
∑
Xj
u˜i
(
xj , b
i, a−i, ω, ωˆ−j
)∑
Mj
γ′j
(
xj |∅,m−ij , bij = N, a−ij
) ∏
h∈Iω ,h6=i
µ¯ h
(
mhj , ∅
∣∣∣ah, γ′j , γ˜−j , ωh)
×
× p¯i−i
(
a−i|γ ′j , γ˜−j , ω−i
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
> U i
(
γ′j , γ˜−j , (µ¯, p¯i) ;ωi
)
, (14)
since type ωi reports ∅ to principal j, and ωˆi to one of his opponents. Again, the same contradiction
obtains.
Alternatively, suppose that type ωi deviates to
(
bi, ωˆi
)
, with bi /∈ supp (p¯ii) and ωˆi ∈ Ωi ∪ {∅}.
Any such deviation is profitable if
∑
Ω−i
∑
A−i
∑
Xj
u˜i
(
xj , b
i, a−i, ω, ωˆ−j
)
γ˜′j
(
xj |ωˆij , ω−ij , bij , a−ij
)
p¯i−i
(
a−i|γ′j , γ˜−j , ω−i
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
>
>
∑
Ω−i
∑
A−i
∑
Xj
u˜i
(
xj , a
i, a−i, ω, ω−j
)
γ˜′j
(
xj |ωj , aij , a−ij
)
p¯i−i
(
a−i|γ′j , γ˜−j , ω−i
)
p
(
ω−i|ωi
)
=
= U i
(
γ′j , γ˜−j , (µ¯, p¯i) ;ωi
)
, (15)
with aij being the j-th element of any ai ∈ supp
(
p¯ii
)
. Whether ωi’s deviation leads to participating
with principal j or not, a contradiction can be established following the same logic illustrated
above. Indeed, the direct mechanism γ˜′j in (9) is constructed so that, if type ωi of agent i deviates
to some participation decision not in the support of p¯ii, it implements a distribution over principal
j’s decisions that ωi could have achieved in the game induced by
(
γ′j , γ˜−j
)
by means of some
message in M ij . This concludes the proof of Lemma 1. 
To complete the proof, we employ Lemma 1, fixing the profile γ˜−j to be the equilibrium mechanisms
γ˜∗−j . It remains to show that the mechanisms
(
γ˜∗j , γ˜∗−j
)
and the strategy λ∗ as constructed in
a.)−b.) constitute an equilibrium in GΓ. Assume, by contradiction, that principal j has a profitable
deviation γ′j ∈ Γj . Then, it must be that
Vj
(
γ ′j , γ˜
∗
−j , λ
∗) > V˜ ∗j ,
which implies that γ ′j 6∈ ΓDj given a.). Then, applying Lemma 1, one can write
Vj
(
γ ′j , γ˜
∗
−j , λ
∗) = Vj (γ˜′j , γ˜∗−j , λ˜) > V˜ ∗j ,
which contradicts that
(
γ˜∗, λ˜∗
)
is a strongly robust equilibrium in GD. 
Proposition 1 establishes a robustness result for truth-telling, strongly robust equilibria: at any
such equilibrium, no principal can gain by using more sophisticated mechanisms. It extends to
incomplete information games of exclusive competition the robustness result of Han (2007).
18
The intuition for the proof can be provided as follows. We first show that for every deviation
γ′j ∈ Γj and every induced equilibrium of the agents’ game, there exists a direct mechanism γ˜′j for
principal j and an equilibrium of the agents’ game induced by (γ˜′j , γ˜−j) that reproduce all decisions
implemented by the mechanisms (γ′j , γ˜−j) in the original equilibrium. The result, established in
Lemma 1, extends the reasoning of Myerson (1982) to a scenario in which agents’ participation
decisions are strategic. This, in particular, ensures that for each direct mechanism γ˜′j and for each
principal j, it is an equilibrium in the game induced by (γ˜′j , γ˜−j) for each type of each agent to be
truthful to principal j when participating with him. Strong robustness of the original equilibrium
guarantees that, if principal j could profitably deviate to some γ′j ∈ Γj , then the correspond-
ing γ˜′j would also be a profitable deviation from such an equilibrium of GD, which generates a
contradiction.
Our proof strategy shows that there is no loss of generality in focusing on principals’ deviations
to direct mechanisms inducing truthful reports to each deviator. This rationalizes the second
feature of the approach followed in applications, as described in Section 2.3. Concerning the third
one, it is implied by the strong robustness requirement, which implies that each deviating principal
is able to coordinate agents on his most preferred continuation equilibrium.
Three assumptions are key for the proof. The first is that each principal plays a pure strategy at
equilibrium. Were principals using mixed strategies, agents would hold some relevant information
when taking their participation and communication decisions, based on the observation of the
realized lottery posted by the principals. Hence, following Peck (1997), indirect communication
would be useful for principals to profitably extract this information.
The second key assumption is the strong robustness of the original equilibrium. If this require-
ment is not met, agents may be able to coordinate on different continuation equilibria when playing
the game GD or any GΓ following the same unilateral deviation of a principal. This could allow to
construct profitable deviations in GΓ.22
The last one is Assumption E. As long as each type of each agent sends non trivial messages only
to the principal it participates with, and given the mechanisms of his competitors, the decisions im-
plemented by any deviation of principal j only depend on the messages he receives from those types
who participate with him. This insight does not extend to the case in which agents’ communication
is unrestricted. To further clarify the role of Assumption E in the proof, we reconsider the model
of Section 2.1, and remove any restriction on agents’ communication. In this situation, from the
viewpoint of a given principal, the (non-degenerate) messages that agents send to his competitors
can be interpreted as hidden actions. Even though these actions are not directly pay-off relevant,
they affect the decisions of his opponents which may impact principal j’s payoff in a way that he
cannot control. This principal is effectively facing a form of moral hazard on the agents’ side. We
22When agents’ participation is strategic, the strong robustness requirement turns out to be key to establish
Proposition 1 even with only one principal. This is shown by means of an example in the working paper version of
this work (Attar et al., 2015).
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show by means of an example that Lemma 1 cannot be established in the presence of this additional
strategic effect. The example is built in an incomplete information context, in which each type of
each agent can communicate with every principal independently of its participation choice.
Example 1 Let I = J = 2. Denote the principals as P1 and P2, and the agents as A1 and
A2. The decision sets are X1 = {x11, x12, x13, x14} for P1, and X2 = {x21, x22, x23, x24} for
P2. Each agent can be of two types, with Ω1 = Ω2 =
{
ω1, ω2
}
. Agents’ types are perfectly
correlated, thus the two states of the world are ω =
{(
ω1, ω1
)
,
(
ω2, ω2
)}
; in addition, we take
prob
(
ω1, ω1
)
= prob
(
ω2, ω2
)
= 0.5.
We construct the example so that no player has state-dependent preferences and assuming that it
is a strictly dominant strategy for each type of each agent to participate with P1. The corresponding
payoffs are represented in the table below, in which the first payoff is that of P1, who chooses the
row, the second payoff is that of P2, who chooses the column, and the last two payoffs are those of
A1 and A2, given that they participate with P1.
Y N
x21 x22 x23 x24
x11 (η, 0,−1,−1) (η, 0, 0, 0) (η, 0,−1,−1) (1, 0, 9, 6)
Y N x12 (η, 0, 7, 0) (η, 0,−1,−1) (2, 0, 6, 9) (η, 0,−1,−1)
x13 (η, 0,−1,−1) (2, 0, 6, 9) (η, 0,−1,−1) (η, 0, 7, 0)
x14 (1, 0, 9, 6) (η, 0,−1,−1) (η, 0, 0, 0) (η, 0,−1,−1)
Table 1: Players’ payoffs in state
(
ω1, ω1
)
and
(
ω2, ω2
)
We also let η < 0 be an arbitrary large loss for P1.
Principals’ decisions can be made contingent on the messages they receive from both agents.
We let γj : Mj → ∆ (Xj) be a decision rule for principal j, holding fixed the agents’ participation
choices of dealing with P1 only. With some abuse of language, we refer to γj as to a mechanism
for principal j = 1, 2. To simplify exposition, we let M ij = Ωi for every j and i. We fix P2’s
mechanism to be
γ˜2
(
m12,m
2
2
)
=

x24 if he receives the message ω1 from both A1 and A2
x23 if he receives ω1 from A1 and ω2 from A2
x22 if he receives ω2 from A1 and ω1 from A2
x21 if he receives the message ω2 from both A1 and A2.
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Along the lines of Lemma 1, we let P1 post the mechanism
γ′1
(
m11,m
2
1
)
=

x11 if he receives the message ω1 from both A1 and A2
x12 if he receives ω1 from A1 and ω2 from A2
x13 if he receives ω2 from A1 and ω1 from A2
x14 if he receives the message ω2 from both A1 and A2.
Given (γ′1, γ˜2), we first show that the agents’ message game exhibits a unique equilibrium, in
which each type of each agent is untruthful to P1 with a strictly positive probability: this yields P1
a payoff of 3/2. In fact, (γ′1, γ˜2) induce the game reported in Table 2.
(
ω1, ω1
) (
ω1, ω2
) (
ω2, ω1
) (
ω2, ω2
)(
ω1, ω1
)
(9, 6) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (6, 9)(
ω1, ω2
)
(0, 0) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (7, 0)(
ω2, ω1
)
(7, 0) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (0, 0)(
ω2, ω2
)
(6, 9) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (9, 6)
Table 2: Agents’ payoffs in the game induced by (γ′1, γ˜2).
In Table 2, A1 chooses the rows and A2 chooses the columns. Each agent reports a type ω ∈
{ω1, ω2} to P1 and P2, respectively. Observe that, for A2, the strategies (ω1, ω2) and (ω2, ω1) are
strictly dominated by
(
ω1, ω1
)
. Upon eliminating them, one can check that reporting
(
ω1, ω2
)
is
strictly dominated by
(
ω2, ω2
)
, and that
(
ω2, ω1
)
is strictly dominated by
(
ω1, ω1
)
for A1. Iterated
elimination of these strictly dominated strategies yields the reduced game in Table 3.
(
ω1, ω1
) (
ω2, ω2
)(
ω1, ω1
)
(9, 6) (6, 9)(
ω2, ω2
)
(6, 9) (9, 6)
Table 3: The reduced agents’ game induced by (γ′1, γ˜2).
The game in Table 3 has no pure strategy equilibrium: the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
prescribes that both A1 and A2 randomize between
(
ω1, ω1
)
and
(
ω2, ω2
)
with equal probabilities.
This equilibrium yields an expected payoff of 3/2 to P1, which is sustained by the array of mecha-
nisms (γ′1, γ˜2) and the agents’ (fully mixed) communication behavior.
We next show that, given γ˜2, there is no way for P1 to obtain a payoff of 3/2 by means of a
direct mechanism γ˜′1 which induces each type of each agent to be truthful to him. Hence, Lemma 1
does not hold.
To establish the result, we first consider the case in which γ˜′1 is a deterministic direct mechanism.
To yield P1 a payoff of 3/2, the mechanisms (γ˜′1, γ˜2) must induce an equilibrium in the agents’
game such that when
(
ωi, ωi
)
realizes, with i = 1, 2, either the decisions (x12, x23) or (x13, x22)
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are played with positive probability. Suppose that
(
ω1, ω1
)
realizes. In this case, for (x12, x23) to
arise in an equilibrium in which agents are truthful to P1, it must be γ˜ ′1
(
ω1, ω1
)
= {x12}. In the
corresponding agents’ game, type ω1 must report
(
ω1, ω1
)
, and type ω2
(
ω1, ω2
)
for {x12, x23} to
be played with positive probability in a truth-telling equilibrium. This point is illustrated in Table 4
which only considers the agents’ payoffs that can be supported in a truth-telling equilibrium.
(
ω1, ω1
) (
ω1, ω2
) (
ω2, ω1
) (
ω2, ω2
)(
ω1, ω1
)
(−1,−1) (6, 9) (., .) (., .)(
ω1, ω2
)
(−1,−1) (7, 0) (., .) (., .)(
ω2, ω1
)
(., .) (., .) (., .) (., .)(
ω2, ω2
)
(., .) (., .) (., .) (., .)
Table 4: Agents’ payoffs in the game induced by γ˜′1 such that γ˜′1(ω1, ω1) = {x12}.
Clearly, when A2 chooses
(
ω1, ω2
)
, A1 prefers
(
ω1, ω2
)
, which makes impossible to implement
the decisions {x12, x23} at equilibrium. A similar reasoning guarantees that, if γ˜′1
(
ω1, ω1
)
= {x13},((
ω1, ω2
)
,
(
ω1, ω1
))
cannot be supported in a truth-telling equilibrium, since A1 prefers
(
ω1, ω1
)
,
which makes impossible to implement {x13, x22} at equilibrium. Given γ˜2, a similar reasoning
applies if
(
ω2, ω2
)
realizes.
We next consider the case in which γ˜ ′1 is a stochastic direct mechanisms. Then, given γ˜2, every
such lottery would put a positive weight on η, whose value can be set arbitrarily small to make
impossible for γ˜ ′1 to yield 3/2 to P1.
The result suggests that Assumption E is tight to establish Lemma 1 and, hence, Proposition
1. The possibility for agents to communicate with P2 when participating with P1 constitutes a
source of moral hazard from the viewpoint of P1. Assumption E severely limits this effect by
guaranteeing that, given participation, P1 is perfectly informed of the messages received by his
opponent. The example also suggests that, when Assumption E is dropped, in order for P1 to be
able to reconstruct the decisions induced by an arbitrary mechanism γ′1 one should consider direct
mechanism that allow him to privately communicate with agents, as in the single-principal setting
of Myerson (1982).23
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of direct mechanisms in games in which principals compete for the
exclusive right to serve agents. We establish two main results. First, restricting principals to use
such mechanisms may involve a loss of generality. Second, when principals post direct mechanisms,
we identify a set of equilibrium outcomes that survive against unilateral deviations towards arbitrary
mechanisms. This rationalizes the approach followed in applications.
23A first example in this direction is constructed in Attar et al. (2012).
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Our analysis could be extended to cope with situations in which principals can take some
actions after the mechanisms have been posted. This possibility arises in economic contexts in
which contract renegotiation is an issue. In the specific case of insurance markets with private
information, following the original intuitions of Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979), several authors
have investigated the implications of insurers withdrawing and/or adding contracts after the initial
negotiation stage.24 In terms of our model, this feature can be captured by assuming that the
mechanism offered by principal j does not uniquely determine his decision, for a given array of
agents’ participation and messages. That is, a principal can take an additional decision after
messages are sent. Identifying the role of direct mechanisms in competitive models of contract
renegotiation is an open issue for future research.25
References
Asheim, G. B. and T. Nilssen (1996): “Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive in-
surance market,” European Economic Review, 40, 1717–1736.
Attar, A., E. Campioni, and G. Piaser (2015): “On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive
Competition,” TSE-Working Paper 15-609.
Attar, A., E. Campioni, G. Piaser, and U. Rajan (2012): “Competing mechanism games of
moral hazard: communication and robustness,” Review of Economic Design, 16, 283–296.
Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1998): “Exclusive Dealing,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 106, 64–103.
Bisin, A. and P. Gottardi (2006): “Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection,”
Journal of Political Economy, 114, 485–516.
Burguet, R. and J. Sakovics (1999): “Imperfect competition in auction designs,” International
Economic Review, 40, 231–247.
Caillaud, B., B. Jullien, and P. Picard (1995): “Competing vertical structures: precommit-
ment and renegotiation,” Econometrica, 621–646.
Eeckhout, J. and P. Kircher (2010): “Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing
mechanisms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1354–1385.
Epstein, L. G. and M. Peters (1999): “A revelation principle for competing mechanisms,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 119–160.
24See, for instance, Hellwig (1987), Asheim and Nilssen (1996) and Netzer and Scheuer (2010).
25In this respect, an important starting point is provided by Szentes (2010) who shows that communication is
instrumental to establish a folk theorem for games of complete information in which principals can take actions after
having posted their mechanisms.
23
Gal-Or, E. (1991): “A common agency with incomplete information,” RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 22, 274–286.
Gal-Or, E. (1997): “Multiprincipal agency relationships as implied by product market competi-
tion,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6, 235–256.
Gottardi, P. and S. Auster (2016): “Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons,” in 2016
Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, 264.
Guerrieri, V., R. Shimer, and R. Wright (2010): “Adverse selection in competitive search
equilibrium,” Econometrica, 78, 1823–1862.
Han, S. (2007): “Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 137, 610–626.
——— (2015): “Robust Competitive Auctions,” Economics Letters, 136C, 207–210.
Hellwig, M. (1987): “Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with
adverse selection ,” European Economic Review, 31, 319–325.
Inderst, R. and A. Wambach (2002): “Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with
adverse selection,” Economic Theory, 19, 525–548.
Martimort, D. (1996): “Exclusive dealing, common agency and multiprincipal incentives theory,”
RAND Journal of Economics, 27, 1–31.
Martimort, D. and S. Piccolo (2010): “The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts,”
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2, 204–229.
Martimort, D. and L. A. Stole (2002): “The revelation and delegation principles in common
agency games,” Econometrica, 70, 1659–1673.
McAfee, P. (1993): “Mechanism design by competing sellers,” Econometrica, 61, 1281–1312.
Myerson, R. B. (1982): “Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent prob-
lems,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 67–81.
Netzer, N. and F. Scheuer (2010): “Competitive Markets without Commitment,” Journal of
Political Economy, 118, 1079 – 1109.
O’Brien, D. P. and G. Shaffer (1997): “Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and
Equilibrium Market Foreclosure,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6, 755–785.
Pagnozzi, M. and S. Piccolo (2013): “Information sharing between vertical hierarchies,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 79, 201–222.
24
Peck, J. (1997): “A note on competing mechanisms and the revelation principle,” Mimeo, Ohio
State University.
——— (2015): “Sky-lift Pricing with Imperfect Competition: An exercise in Competing Mecha-
nisms,” Mimeo, Ohio State University.
Peters, M. (1997): “A competitive distribution of auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 64,
97–123.
——— (2001): “Common Agency and the Revelation Principle,” Econometrica, 69, 1349–1372.
——— (2003): “Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 111, 88–109.
——— (2004): “Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents,” Economic Theory, 23,
183–194.
——— (2014): “Survey on Competing Mechanisms 2 - The revelation principle,” Canadian Journal
of Economics, 47(2), 373–397.
Peters, M. and S. Severinov (1997): “Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead
of prices,” Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 141–179.
Prescott, E. and R. Townsend (1984): “Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,” Econometrica, 52, 21–45.
Rey, P. and T. Vergé (2008): “Economics of Vertical Restraints,” in Handbook of Antitrust
Economics, MIT Press, 353–390.
Riley, J. G. (1979): “Informational Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 47, 331–59.
Rochet, J.-C. (1985): “The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations,” Jour-
nal of Mathematical Economics, 14, 113–128.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1976): “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629–649.
Schlee, E. and H. Chade (2012): “Optimal insurance with adverse selection,” Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 7.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1977): “Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance
Market,” Review of Economic Studies, 44, 407–430.
Szentes, B. (2010): “A note on Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more
agents by T. Yamashita,” Mimeo, London School of Economics.
25
Viràg, G. (2010): “Competing Auctions: Finite Markets and Convergence,” Theoretical Eco-
nomics, 5, 241–274.
Wilson, C. (1977): “A model of insurance markets with incomplete information,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 16, 167–207.
Yamashita, T. (2010): “Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents,”
Econometrica, 78, 791–801.
26
